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Abstract--ln this paper, we study the production scheduling problem in a price competition. 
Two firms produce the same product and compete with each other. The production capacity of each 
firm is random, due to random breakdowns. The demand process and its allocation are random 
and affected by the pricing strategies of both firms. We consider a finite planning horizon. The 
scheduling problem is formulated as a finite dynamic game. Algorithms are developed to determine 
the control policies of interest. Numerical cases are studied to observe the system behavior under 
those policies. We also construct a single-firm optimization model and demonstrate that the policy 
from the single-firm model may not perform well in a competitive environment. 
Keywords - -P roduct ion  scheduling, Inventory, Pricing, Stochastic dynamic games. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider issues in the control of production for manufacturing systems in competition. A 
special case is studied. In this case, there are two production systems (also referred to as firms) 
which produce the same product and compete through choices of production levels and prices 
for the goods they deliver to customers. The demand in the market is the number of customers 
purchasing the product. The number of customers on a given day is a function of the prices and 
the system status. Customers are patient such that they will stay in the system until being fulfilled 
regardless the waiting times and changes of prices. Each day, each unit of the available demand 
is allocated to Firm 1 with a probability or to Firm 2 otherwise. The allocation probability 
is affected by the prices in such a way that the firm with higher price has a smaller chance of 
winning the orders from customers. Both production systems are prone to random failures that 
makes the production capacities uncertain. A firm can produce up to its max imum capacity if it 
is operational or produce nothing if it is down. In such a system setting, we study how the two 
firms will competitively decide how much they will produce and how they will price their product 
daily. 
The problem of competitive production scheduling has attracted attention from researchers. 
In [1], Levitan and Shubik modeled the price competition between two production systems as 
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an infinite stochastic game. The production systems are assumed to be perfectly reliable, i.e., 
they are operational at all time. Kirman and Sobel [2] studied inventory control in an N-firm 
price competition, and formulated it as an infinite dynamic game. In [3], Li studied the role 
of inventory in a delivery-time competition with shortage cost, and investigated the structural 
properties of the optimal production control policy. In [4], a stochastic dynamic game model was 
developed for a two-firm competition with random system failures. The demand on each day 
is allocated between the two firms in a deterministic manner. In [5], the authors extended the 
model of Bal [4] by adopting a randomized allocation rule for the demand. The models in [4,5] 
deal with a finite horizon quantity competition where the prices are fixed during the planning 
horizon. 
In this paper, we study a finite horizon price competition. The model we develop is different 
from those in [1-3] because we include system breakdowns explicitly. The difference from the 
models in [4,5] is due to the decisions on prices. In the next section, we describe the system 
and its dynamics. The production scheduling problem is formulated as a finite dynamic game in 
Section 3. Algorithms are developed to determine the production control strategies of interest 
in Section 4. Numerical examples are presented in Section 5. The comparison with the optimal 
solution from a single-firm model is made in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 contains the concluding 
remarks. 
2. THE SYSTEM AND ITS  DYNAMICS 
We consider a market in which there are two firms (also referred to as production systems) 
which produce the same product and compete against each other. Both systems are subject 
to random breakdowns. For Firm i, the time to fail and time to repair are assumed to have 
independent geometric distributions with means 1/pi and 1/ri, respectively. Breakdowns of 
different firms are statistically independent. Denote by a(k) = (~1 (k), a2(k)} the system status 
on Day k, where 
1, if Firm i is operational on Day k, 
hi (k)= 0, otherwise. 
Then, state changes of Firm i are governed by a Markov chain with transition probabilities 
prob {a~(k + 1) = 1 ] a~(k) = O} = ri; 
prob {ai(k + 1) = 0 I hi(k) = 1} = Pi. 
Firm i can produce up to its capacity Ui each day if it is operational. Let u(k) = {ul(k), u2(k)} 
be the production vector on Day k, which satisfies 
o < u (k) < (1) 
Here and elsewhere in this paper, we assume that all the system parameters and variables 
except he failure and repair rates take only integer values, unless stated otherwise. 
At the beginning of Day k, Firm i announces the price, //~(k) (> 0), for its product and 
determine the production level ui(k) without knowing what the competitor is doing. We assume 
that Bi(k) is chosen from a given set O~ which is finite and bounded. The daily number of 
potential customers D(k) in the market on Day k is modeled as a function of the average price 
on that day. This reflects the situation that the reduction of price during a sales promotion will 
likely attract more customers to the market from a total population D. The daily demand (k) 
for the product is a random variable, 
0 < d(k) < D(k), 
where 
DCa) = (2) 
/ / 
/ .i 
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in which D (> 0) is the maximum demand value and Pl (> 0) is the demand decaying factor 
with respect o the average price on Day k. Furthermore, the distribution of d(k) is given as a 
function of D(k), denoted by pk(d(k)) and demands on different days are assumed to be IID. 
We use I(k) = {Ii(k), I2(k)} to denote the vector of inventory levels and Q(k) to denote the 
unfulfilled demand on Day k, which satisfy 
Is(k)Q(k) = 0, i = 1,2. (3) 
Let es(k) be the total amount of available products in Firm i on Day k, which is the sum of 
inventory and production, 
ei(k) = ui(k) + Ii(k). 
Let E(k) be the total demand on Day k which is the sum of the current daily demand and the 
unfulfilled customers, 
E(k) = d(k) + Q(k). 
On Day k, each unit of the total demand E(k) is allocated to Firm i which offers the lower price, 
with probability 
qs(k) = e -°2((&(k))/(~Ak)))2, for ris(k) <_ rid(k), (i ¢ j), (4) 
where P2 (> 0) is a known constant. The allocation probabilities on Day k satisfy 
2 
qi(k) = 1. 
i= l  
REMARK. The demand allocation scheme reflects that only a certain portion of customers are 
sensitive to price and the others may either be not under a tight budget or do not have the 
information on time to make a price-sensitive decision. In addition, the delivery time should 
also play a role in the competition. That is, the firm which delivers more quickly will have the 
opportunity to serve more customers. This is modeled below by allowing customers to go to the 
competitor if a firm cannot fulfill its demand. 
Let a(k) = {al(k), a2(k)} represent the demand allocation vector on Day k. That is, ai(k) is 
the number of customer orders allocated to Firm i on Day k, which satisfies al + a2 = E(k). 
Given E(k), the distribution function of ai(k) is 
p{as(k) = n l E(k)} = ( E(nk) ) qi(k)n (1 -qs(k) )  E(k)-n , n- -0  . . . .  ,E(k). (5) 
Denote by xs(k) the sales of Firm i on Day k. If the demand as(k) is greater than or equal to 
the available inventory es(k), then Firm i sells all its available goods. Otherwise, the remaining 
demand will be transferred to its competitor. The unfulfilled demand at the end of each day, if 
any, will be carried over to the next day, attached to neither firm. If the demand is less then the 
available inventory, unsold products are put into the inventory of the next day. In summary, we 
have 
/ 
e~(k), if a~(k) > ei(k); 
ei(k), if es(k) - as(k) <_ ad(k ) - ed(k ), 
and a~(k) < es(k), j y~ i; 
as(k) + ad(k) - ej(k), if ei(k) - as(k) > ad(k ) - ed(k ), 
and ad(k ) > ej(k), j ¢ i; 
ai(k), if as(k) < e~(k), and ad(k ) < ed(k), j • i. 
(6) 
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REMARK. The customers are assumed to be patient, that is, once they enter the market, they 
will stay until being fulfilled. However, individual customers do not attach to either firm during 
their stay in the market. At the beginning of a given day, each customer will decide according 
to (4) which firm it will go first to buy the product. If the selected company does not have the 
product available, the customer goes to the competitor. If the competitor cannot satisfy the 
demand either, the customer waits until the next day and repeats the procedure until it gets the 
product. Intuitively, if the demand level in the market is low, the product will be constantly 
available. The price will be an important factor for a firm to attract customers and the firm with 
larger production capacity does not necessarily have the any advantage. However, if the demand 
level is high, product is not always available, the delivery time would play a more important 
role. Consequently, the firm with larger production capacity will have a chance to serve more 
customers. The demand allocation and reallocation scheme used here captures this feature. It 
will be verified by numerical examples in Section 5. 
The dynamics of inventories and unfulfilled emand are governed by 
I , (k  + 1) = I (k) + u i (k )  - i = 1, 2, (7) 
2 2 
i~ l  i= l  
The planning horizon is finite. We consider a period of N days, indexed from 0 to N - 1. At 
the beginning of Day 0, the system is initialized, 
Ii(O) = I °, Q(O) = QO, o~i(O) = c~ -°., i = 1,2. (9) 
On Day k, the inventory I~(k) and the unfulfilled demand Q(k) are carried over from the 
previous day. The system state ~i(k) is observed according to the given Markov chain. Then, 
each firm must make a pair of decisions: announcing the price and determining the amount of 
goods it will produce. The maximum daily demand D(k) is then determined using equation (2) 
and the demand (k) is observed according to the given distribution function pk(d(k)). The total 
demand E(k) is allocated between the two firms according to (5). At the end of the day, the 
sales zi(k) is realized according to (6), and /~(k ÷ 1) and Q(k -t- 1) are determined, using (7) 
and (8), for the next day. 
3. THE SCHEDULING PROBLEM 
In this section, we formulate the production scheduling problem as a stochastic dynamic game. 
The system status (up or down), unfulfilled demand, and available inventories are the state 
variables. The control variables are the price and the production level of each firm on each day. 
A control policy is a sequence of mapping functions from the state space to the control space, 
which span the planning horizon. 
During the planning horizon, Firm i selects the price /~i _> 0 for its product repeatedly and 
independently from a given set ei. The control variable ui(k) can take values from a nonempty 
set f~(k), 
f~i(k) = {ui(k) I 0 < u~(k) <_ Uia~(k)}, i = 1, 2; k -- 0, 1 . . . .  , N - 1. (10) 
Let Ci(k) be the set of feasible controls for Firm i and Sk the set of feasible states on Day k, 
Ci(k) = {O,, ~(k)},  
Sk = {I(k), Q(k), ~(k)}. 
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Let ~u~k be a mapping function from Sk to Ci(k), 
#,~(I(k) ,Q(k) ,~(k))  e Ci(k), for all ( I (k) ,Q(k) ,a(k) )  • Sk. (II) 
We consider the class of control laws (also called policies or strategies), lh, (i = 1,2), which 
consist of a sequence of control functions, 
The feasible production policies for each firm form a finite set. For a given pair of policies (one 
for each firm), the system performances can be measured in terms of the expected payoffs which 
are defined as follows. 
Let 
d = {d(0), d(1), . . . ,  d(N - 1)}, 
c~ = {a(0),a(1), . . .  , (~(N-  1)}, 
E = {E(0), E(1) , . . . ,  E(N - 1)}, 
a = {a(0),a(1), . . .  , a (g -  1)}. 
A sample of d specifies a possible demand sequence from Day 0 to Day N - 1, and an outcome 
of (~ determines the system states for both firms during the planning horizon. For given d and a, 
E(k)  is determined by a(k - 1), u(k - 1), and I (k - 1) in a deterministic manner. Given E, 
a determines the demand allocation of each day during the planning horizon. Their probability 
distributions are well defined. 
The inventory holding cost for Firm i is ~fi (>_ 0) per unit per day during the planning horizon, 
(i = 1, 2; k = 0 , . . . ,  N - 1). In addition, if there are unsold products at the end of Day N - 1, 
i.e., I~(N) > 0, Firm i has to pay 6~ I for each unit of the leftover inventory. For given control 
policies lrl and Ir2, the expected payoff of Firm i is 
Ji (lrl, 7r2) = E E /~  1 [ f l~(k)z~(k) -~f , I , (k) ] -6 i l l , (N)~,  i=  1, 2, (12) 
{d,a}{a[E} l,,k=O J 
and the total expected payoffs for the two firms is 
J(Trl,?r2)--- E E ~ [~ i (k )x~(k) -6 , I , (k ) ] -6 , I I , (N  ) . (13) 
{d,a}falE} i=1 k=O 
Now we formally define the control policies of interest. 
DEFINITION 1. A strategy #~ is coiled the security policy of Firm i if it attains the security 
payoff, 
Ji =max~ min J~(lrl,lr2)} i=1 ,2 .  
DEFINITION 2. A policy #i is called the hazard policy of Firm i if it attains the hazard payoff, 
) 
J, = max max J~ (Irl, Ir2) i = 1,2. 
DEFINITION 3. A pair of policies, {Ir~, ~r~}, are coiled Nash policies if they satisfy 
J l  Orl,lr~) g J1 (Ir~,~'~), 
* 7[" 0'20U, 2) < 52 OrL1G) • 
J~(lr~,Ir~) is referred to as Nash payoff for Firm i. 
CAJ'NA 33:5-B 
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DEFINITION 4. A pair of po~cies (r~l, 7r~ ) is said to be better than another pair of po~cies (Tr~ , 
~|  I I  I I  - -  I ! (~rl, 7r2) < J1 (T'I, 71"2) , 
J2 ( ' i ' ,  --< ' ' 
and at least one of the inequalities i strict. 
DEFINITION 5. A pair of Nash policies is said to be Pareto dominate ff there exist no better 
pairs of Nash policies. 
DEFINITION 6. A pair of policies Or~, r~) is called the cooperative policies if it maximizes the 
tota/payoff, 
jc = max J (7rl, 7r2). 
(~1 ,~2) 
4. COMPUTATION ALGORITHMS 
In this section, we develop algorithms to determine the control strategies and payoffs defined 
in the previous ection. In essence, the cooperative policy is an optimal control policy and the 
security (hazard) policy for each firm is a maximin (maximax) control strategy. Finding such a 
policy is a optimization problem which can be solved using existing dynamic programming (DP) 
techniques. In this section, we introduce three DP algorithms to determine the security, hazard, 
and cooperative policies and payoffs for each firm without derivations. Interested readers are 
referred to the literature of stochastic dynamic programming ormore specifically to Bertsekas [6]. 
ALGORITHM 1. (Determining security policies) 
J,,N( I ( N), Q( N), a( N) ) = -6~I ,( N); 
Ji,k(I(k), Q(k), a(k)) = max 
u~(k)en~(k) 
min E 
fl~(k)ee~ {d(k),a(k)lE(k)} 
us(k)en~(k)d#i 
+ 
[ ~(k)x~(k) - ~f~Ii(k) 
+ 1),Q(k+ 1),a(k+ 1))] / ;  J,,k+,(/(k E 
{a(k+l)la(k)} J J 
i = 1,2; k=O, 1 .... ,N -1 .  
ALGORITHM 2. (Determining hazard policies) 
Ji,N( I ( N), Q( N), a( N) ) = -Sil l i(N); 
J~,k(I(k), Q(k), a(k)) = max 
u~(k)En~(k) 
+ E 
I max E [~i(k)xi(k) - 6~I~(k) 
f~j(k)EOj {d(k),a(k)lE(k)} 
~, uj (k)eNj (k),j•i 
{a(k+l)la(k)} £,k+l(I(k 4- 1), Q(k 4- 1), oz(k 4- 1))] } ; 
) 
i=1 ,2 ;  k=O, l , . . . ,N -1 .  
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ALGORITHM 3. (Determining cooperative policies) 
2 
J~(I(N),  Q(N), o~(N)) = - E <SiIIi(Y); 
i=1 
J~(I(k),Q(k),a(k)) = max E [3~(k)x~(k) - 6+I~(k) 
/~x(k)eOt,fl2(k)e02 {d(k),a(k)lE(k)} .= 
u,(k)efl~(k),u2(k)efh(k) 
-I- S J~+l ( I (k  -}- l ) ,Q(k -[- 1), o~(k n t- 1))] ~ ; 
{a(k+l)l~(k)} J J 
k=O, 1 , . . . ,N -1 .  
The following three theorems link the DP algorithms above to the security and hazard policies 
for each individual firm. The proofs are similar to those given in [6] for a similar problem and 
are omitted here. 
PROPOSITION 1. 
,], = :,,o (I°,Q°,(~°), i=  1,2. 
Furthermore, if {f~(k),~+(k)} = ~k(I(k),Q(k),a(k)) optimizes the right sides of Algorithm 1 
for each { I ( k ), Q( k ), a(k)} and k, the control law ~ri = {~+0,--., PiN-l} is a security policy for 
Firm i, (i = 1,2). 
PROPOSITION 2. 
+= 1,2. 
Furthermore, if {~(k),fi i(k)} = fqk(I(k),Q(k),a(k)) optimizes the right sides of Algorithm 2 
for each {I(k), Q(k),a(k)} and k, the control law ~ri = {12,0,..., ]2+N-1} is a hazard policy for 
Firm i, (i = 1, 2). 
PROPOSITION 3. 
J~ = J8 (I°,Q°,a°) • 
Fhrthermore, if {f~(k), u~(k)} = #[k(I(k), Q(k), a(k)) optimizes the right sides of Algorithm 3 
for each { I ( k ), Q( k ), a( k ) } and k, the control law ~r~ = {#Co,... ,P~N-t} is a cooperative policy 
for Firm i, (i = 1,2). 
If Nash policies exist, the following algorithm will find an admissible pair. Otherwise, it 
generates a pair of pseudo-Nash policies. 
ALGORITHM 4. 
STEP 0. Collect input data and assign terminal costs, 
J~g ( I ( N), Q( N), (~( Y)  ) = -61511( N); 
J~N(I(N), Q(N), or(N)) = -62.fI2(Y); (14) 
for all (I(N), Q(N), a(N)) e SN. 
STEP N - k. For a given state (I(k), Q(k), a(k)) E Sk at stage k (k = N - 1 , . . . ,  0), set up the 
bimatrix game with payoff matrices, 
J lk  ((f~l(k), ul(k)),  (•(k), u2(k))) = Ed(k) [~l(k)xt(k) - 6111(k) 
+E(a(k+1)la(k)}J~,k+1(I(k + l),Q(k + l),a(k + I))] ; 
J2k (f~l (k), ul(k)) ,  (f~2(k), u2(k)) : Edck ) [~2(k)x2(k) - ~212(k) (15) 
+ E{a(k+l)la(k)}J~,k+l(I(k + 1),Q(k + 1),a(k + 1))] ; 
for all (Bl(k),ul(k)) e Cl(k) and (&(k),u2(k)) e C2(k), 
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and solve for (fPk, ui*k) and Ji*k(.) such that 
Jrk (I(k), Q(k), a(k)) = Jlk ((fl[k, u~k), (B~k, U~k)) >-- glk ((81 (k), Ul (k)), (/3~, U~k)) ,
for all (t~l(k),ul(k)) e Cl(k); 
(16) 
J~k(l(k), Q(k), (~(k)) -- J2k ((~;k, u~k), (Nk, u~k)) _> Jl~ ((~;k, u~k), (&(k), ~(k))), 
for all (X~2(k), u2(k)) E C2(k). 
The linear-time algorithm in [7] may be used for finding pure strategy Nash equilibria of the 
bimatrix game. If solution exists, return an admissible pair of policies (~k, U'k) and payoffs J~k('), 
otherwise report that there exist no Nash policies and determine the pseudo-Nash policies by 
letting 
ik = f~ik(I(k),Q(k),a(k)); % 
STEP N+I .  If all the bimatrix games above have Nash solutions, report the Nash policies and 
payoffs, otherwise return the pseudo-Nash solutions, 
j~ = j* ( i  o, QO, so) lO 
J~ = J]*o ( I° ,Q°,a°),  
and 
#~k(I(k), Q(k), a(k) ) = arg J~k(I(k), Q(k), a(k) ), 
~k(l(k), Q(k), ~(k)) = arg J~*k (I(k), Q(k), ~(k)), 
(I(k), Q(k), a(k)) E Sk; k =0, . . . ,N -  1. 
PROPOSITION 4. Algorithm 4 processes the competitive scheduling problem. By processing we 
mean that the algorithm will either produce an admissible pair of Nash policies or show that no 
Nash policies exist and generate a pair of pseudo-Nash policies in finite time. 
PROOF. The proof is similar to that in [4] for a similar problem. 
So far in this paper, we have formulated the competitive production scheduling problem as a 
stochastic dynamic game and developed computation algorithms for solutions of interest. In the 
next section, we calculate the security, hazard, Nash, and cooperative policies and payoffs using 
the algorithms and also perform simulations for a variety of cases to observe system behaviors in 
competition. 
5. A NUMERICAL  STUDY 
In preceding sections, we have developed algorithms for determining the control policies of 
interest. In order to evaluate and to compare the effectiveness of these policies, in this section, 
we study a numerical case to observe the system behavior. 
CASE 1. 
Firml:  rl =0.5, p I=0.1 ,  Ut=3,  
61 = 2, 61f  = 5. 
Firm 2:1"2 = 0.5,  P2 = 0.3,  0"2 = 6, 
62 = 2, 62f = 5. 
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N=8,  11(0)=/2(0)=Q(0)=0,  a1(0)=~2(0)=1.  
D = 16, Pl =0.0005578, P2 = 0.69. 
O1 = 02 = {10,15, 20, 25, 30}. 
The daily demand (k) is uniformly distributed in [0, D(k)]. 
In this case, Firm 1 may produce up to three units on a given day if it is operational, and 
produce nothing if it is down. The average production capacity of Firm 1 is then 
E ( (~ I U1) = ( rr~+~l ) Ul = 2.5. 
Similarly, Firm 2 has an average capacity 
E (cz2U2) = 3.75. 
Algorithms 1-4 developed in the previous ection were implemented using a C program to 
generate the optimal production control policies and pricing strategies. For the given system 
in Case 1, the expected payoffs under the security, Nash and hazard policies for each firm are 
calculated and listed in the following. 
Firm 1: J1  --- 347.2, J[ = 512.4, Jl = 621.8. 
(17) 
Firm 2: J2  = 504.1, J~ = 528.6, 32 = 935.4. 
As stated in Section 3, we see that Nash payoff is bounded by security and hazard payoffs for 
each firm. Algorithm 3 returns only the total average payoff, instead of the separate average 
payoffs for individual firms. However, it generates detailed production control policy and pricing 
strategy for each firm. 
In order to evaluate the system behavior under different decision rules, we perform simulations 
using the Nash and cooperative policies generated above. Since each firm has two policies which 
we want to investigate, there are four possible configurations. For each configuration, 500 simu- 
lation runs are made using different seeds for the random number generator. The average payoffs 
over the 500 simulation runs are listed in Table 1. If we view this as a two-person, onzero-sum 
game, from the simulation results, we observe that the payoffs when both firms play their Nash 
policies constitute the equilibrium point of such a game. In other words, the cooperative policy 
is unstable in competition. In the following, we focus our attention on the Nash policies. 
Table 1. The average payoffs from simulations for Case 1. 
Firm 2 Firm 2 
J1 Nash Cooperative J2 Nash Cooperative 
Nash 513.3 453.6 I Nash 520.4 478.4 
Firrf 1 Firm 1 I Cooperative 380.9 286.7 Cooperative 715.7 870.4 
We further evaluate the system performances byperforming sensitivity analyses. We vary the 
total number of potential customers D in the market in Case 1. 
For different values of D, the security, Nash and hazard payoffs axe calculated using the algo- 
rithms in the previous ection and are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Simulations are performed 
for the ease that both firms play their Nash policies. The simulated Nash payoffs are indicated by 
the discrete circles in Figures 1 and 2. We observe that the Nash payoff is bounded by the other 
two payoffs and the three payoffs converge to the same value as the total demand D increases. 
From this observation, we conjecture that when demand level is very high, the Nash equilibrium 
agrees with the optimal solution from single-firm optimization models. That is, if demand level is 
high, each firm should produce at its maximum capacity and sells all its products. Consequently, 
both firms need not be concerned with the competition. This conjecture is further varified when 
we make comparison with a single-firm optimization model in Section 6. 
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Figure 2. The payoffs of Firm 2. 
From simulation of Nash policies, the average sales for individual firms for different D values 
are reported in Figure 3. The average sales are increasing functions of D and converge to some 
constant values. When the demand level is low (D < 20 in this case), the two firms have about 
equal number of customers. When the demand level is high, Firm 2 realizes higher sales due to 
its higher production capacity. This agrees with our modeling assumption that a firm with higher 
production capacity should not have significant advantage in terms of attracting customers when 
demand level is low in the market. When demand level is high, the firm with higher production 
capacity can deliver product faster and therefore has the advantage in sales. 
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Figure 3. The average sales from simulation. 
To this point, we have observed some production behaviors in competition through numerical 
analyses. In the next section, we consider a single-firm optimization model and compare the 
system performance with those of competitive models. 
6. COMPARISON WITH S INGLE-F IRM OPT IMIZAT ION 
In single-firm production models, one usually considers that customer orders arrive following a 
prescribed stochastic process which is independent of the other firm's price or other actions. These 
customer orders may be satisfied by productions in the current stage of time or by inventories 
from previous tages. Unfulfilled emand will wait until products are available. An optimization 
problem can then be formulated to decide the production and pricing strategies with the presence 
of random disruptions in demand and system capacity. 
It is not known, however, if the control policies from single-firm models will remain effective in 
a competitive environment where production and price decisions of one firm may affect hose of 
other firms and may also affect he realization of the demand process. In this section, we intend 
to examine the control policies from a single-firm optimization model by putting them into a 
competition against hose of competitive models. 
There is, however, essentially no direct relation between a single-firm odel and a competitive 
model. In order to make them comparable, we construct a single-firm odel using the data given 
in the competitive model and a heuristic mapping relation between the demand processes and the 
state spaces for the two models. We would like to point out that there may be many other ways 
to device the single-firm model. The key assumption we make here is that the demand process 
does not depend on the other firm's price or other actions. However, we must have in mind that 
this is not the real situation. It is only the firm's perception. Therefore, the single-firm demand 
process hould reflect he firm's conjecture on competition. For example, the firm may model the 
demand process as the share of demand it can get if the other firm charges an "average" price. 
The purpose of the single-firm model is to derive a strategy. When the strategy is employed in 
the competitive situation, the game model must be applied. Clearly, there may be more than one 
poosible single-firm model and the better the firm can predict he "uncertainty" resulted from 
competition the better the single-firm strategy would work. 
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We present he single-firm optimization model in the following. All the notations used below 
are the same as those defined in Section 2, except hat a superscript s is used for those of the 
single-firm model. In order to establish the single-firm model, we need to work out four basic 
components. First, we need to estimate the demand process based on the data given in the 
competitive model; second the system dynamics; third the objective functional; and fourth the 
mapping relation between the state spaces for the two models. 
Demand Process 
We assume that the daily demand d~(k) for Firm i (i = 1, 2) is a random variable and is IID on 
different days. It satisfies 
0 <_ d~(k) <_ D~.(k), 
where 
= , j¢ i ,  
and/~j is the mean value of the feasible price set Oj of Firm j. 
REMARK. Different kind of estimator of the average price of Firm j may be used for f~j. 
If the daily demand (k) is uniformly distributed in the competitive model (see Case 1), then 
the distribution function of d~ (k) is 
D~(k) 
prob{d~(k)=n}= 1 ~(M)  D~(k) + 1 = qi(k) n (1 - qi(k)) M-n 
n=O, 1,...,D~(k); i=1 ,2 ;  k=O,. . . ,7 ,  
(18) 
where qi(k) is defined in Section 2. 
REMARK. The distribution function above is derived such that the demand process in the single- 
firm model is as close as possible to that a firm would experince in the competitive model. A 
numerical example can be found in [5] for a similar problem. 
System Dynamics 
The system dynamics of Firm i (i = 1,2) is governed by 
x~(k)=min{I~(k) +u~(k),d~(k)+Q~(k)}, 
I~(k+l)=I~.(k)+u~(k) -x~(k), 
Q~(k+l)=d~(k)+Q~(k) -x~(k). 
Objective Funct ional  
Firm i would like to optimize its expected payoff, 
J~'= nlaxEd~,a~ , /~  1~=0 [/?~(k)x~(k)- 6d~(k)]-$, , I~(N) } ,  i=  1,2. (19) 
Finding J~ is a basic dynamic programming problem and can be solved using existing dynamic 
programming techniques ( ee [6]). The resulting control policy is referred to as the single policy. 
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Mapping Relations 
Since the state space of the single-firm model is different from that of the competitive model, 
we need to relate the two state spaces in order to make the comparison. For a system state 
{It(k), Q~(k), c~(k)} in the single-firm model and {I(k), Q(k), c~(k)} in the competitive model, 
we use the relationship, 
X (k) = Z,(k), 
Q (k) = [q iQ(k) ] ,  
= 
(20) 
The second equality above is a heuristic. For the single-firm model, the unfulfilled demand in a 
firm has nothing to do with the other firm. In the competitive model, however, the unfulfilled 
demand comes from both firms. Since the unfulfilled demand will merge into the total demand 
and each unit of the total demand will be allocated to Firm i with probability qi, the heuristic 
mapping relation appears plausible. 
In the following, we present a numerical example and carry out the comparison for different 
policies. 
CASE 2. 
F i rml :  r1=0.5,  p l=0-1 ,  U l=4,  
61 = 2, 61I = 5. 
Firm 2:?'2 = 0.5, P2 = 0.1, U2 = 4, 
62 = 2, 621 = 5. 
N=8,  I1 (0 )=/2(0)=Q(0)=0,  ch(0)=a2(0)=l .  
D = 16, Pl =0.0005578, P2 = 0.69. 
O, = e2 = {10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. 
The daily demand (k) is uniformly distributed in [0, D(k)]. 
This system can be separated as follows as single-firm models. 
Firm 1: r i=0 .5 ,  p t=0.1 ,  U1=4,  
61 = 2, 61f -- 5. 
N=8,  / I (0 )=Q~(0)=0,  ~(0)=1.  
D = 16, Pl = 0.0005578, P2 = 0.69. 
O1 = {10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. 
Firm 2: r2=0.5, p2--0.1, U2--4, 
62 = 2, 621 - 5. 
8 N=8,  15(0 )=Q2(0)=0,  a~(0)=l .  
D = 16, Pl = 0.0005578,  P2 = 0.69. 
{92 = {10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. 
For this given case, the single-firm optimization problem is solved using the existing DP algo- 
rithm (see [6]) and the competitive model is solved using the algorithms in Section 2. Following 
the same procedure as described in the previous section, simulations are made that each firm 
chooses its control policy from among the Nash and single policies. The results axe listed in 
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Table 2. The average payoffs for Case 2. 
J1, ,/2 
Nash 
Single 
Firm 2 
Nash Single 
503.4,493.0 714.3,384.4 
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Figure 4. The average payoffs of Firm 1 for Case 2. 
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Table 2 for the four possible policy configurations. We observe that the Nash policy outperforms 
the other in terms of attaining an equilibrium. 
A sensitivity analysis is performed for this system by varying the total number of potential 
customers D. For different values of D, the control policies are calculated for each firm and 
simulations are made for different policy combinations. Figures 4 and 5 depict he average payoffs 
from simulation for some policy combinations. We observe that the single policy is unstable. For 
instance, if Firm 1 plays its single policy and Firm 2 selects its Nash policy, the payoff is low for 
Firm 1 and high for Firm 2. In addition, we also observe that when the demand level is high 
(D > 50 in the case), all policy configurations under condsideration generate the same payoffs. 
This varifies our conjecture that the Nash equilibrium agrees with the single-firm optimal solution 
when there is excessive demand in the market. 
7. SUMMARY 
In this paper, we have studied a price competition between two firms which produce the 
same product. We have formulated the problem as a dynamic stochastic game and developed 
algorithms to determine control policies for each individual firm. Through numerical solutions 
and simulations, we analyzed the system performance under the Nash policies in competition. 
We observe that when the total number of potential customers increases, the average payoffs for 
both firms increase and eventually converge to constant values. When the demand level is low, 
the two firms compete for customers by selecting price and production level. The firm with larger 
production capacity has no significant advantage in soliciting customers. When the total demand 
is excessive, each firm produces at full capacity and sells all its products. Consequently, both 
firms need not be concerned about the competition. 
We also constructed a single-firm optimization model and examined the resulted policies. We 
observed that the control policies from the single-firm model may be vulnerable against hose 
from competitive models. However, if the demand is excessive, the single-firm policy performs as 
well as any competitive policy. 
The model developed in this work is simple and abstract. For instance, we did not consider 
the behavior of the customers, processes of production flows, etc. These are possible topics for 
future research in this area. 
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